In 1954, Sir David Robertson, the MP for Sutherland and Caithness, put forward a plan to convert the railway from Inverness to Wick and Thurso into a motor road. This became known, as least unofficially, as the Highland Autobahn.

Sir David is an interesting character. His father came from Caithness but he was educated in Glasgow and trained as accountant and then served in the First World War. After the war he went into business, managing several companies in the developing frozen fish industry. Roberston was adopted in the Streatham constituency for the 1940 election as the sitting member was retiring. In the event he was elected unopposed at a by-election. In his maiden speech he raised the issue of facilities for troops at London's mainline stations. He complained that most had no facilities at all for troops to wash and sleep, and the facility at Liverpool Street station run by the YMCA was "like the Black Hole of Calcutta". Robertson's contribution produced an immediate move to improve conditions.

He moved to the Sutherland & Caithness constituency in 1950, defeating Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Liberal leader who had also been Secretary of State for Air in Churchill's coalition government. Robertson took great interest in constituency matters. In the late 1950s he became very critical of the government, describing the Scottish Secretary, John Maclay, as "a Treasury lackey and a mouthpiece for officialdom". He resigned the Tory whip in 1959 but retained the seat as an independent in the election of October that year as the Conservatives did not put up a candidate due to his local popularity. He retired in 1964 and died in 1970.

One of his main concerns was the difficulties of road travel in the northern counties. Looking at the deserted railway line one day, he conceived the idea that it would be much better used if converted to a motor road. He prepared a memo which pointed to the current transport difficulties - roads of poor quality, dangerous with many hairpin bends, narrow and without foundations. The railway on the other hand was losing money heavily, the trains were dirty, infrequent, slow and expensive. The cure was for the government to spend much more money on road improvements. As a first step, the railway from Inverness to Wick and Thurso should be converted into a fast motor road on which horses, cyclists and all slow moving traffic would be excluded.

In 1955 Robertson obtained estimates from Balfour Beatty, which were produced by their Mr Hemingway and indicated that the cost for a 22ft wide road would be about £4.5m. BR would operate a road passenger and goods service. Journey time to Wick and Thurso would be about half the current duration, i.e. between 3 and 4 hours. The road would be free to all users, with access at existing stations. Stations would still be staffed to sell tickets and deal with freight.

The formation of 22ft, which consisted of an 18ft carriageway and two 2ft verges, would be obtained by lowering embankments and raising the bottoms of cuttings. Existing overbridges would not be widened; only a single lane would be provided at them. The existing viaduct at Invershin would carry a single track road. Existing road over-bridges would be altered to give additional headroom, while railway bridges would be widened although not strengthened. Removal of track was assumed to be undertaken by BR staff. No kerbs were included.

Robertson wrote to John Boyd-Carpenter, the Minister of Transport, on 19th July 1955 with his proposal which was passed on to civil servants to deal with. The immediate reaction was that 12ft lanes were needed, plus hard shoulders as adopted at that time for the M1, making the total width 49ft. All overbridges would have to be reconstructed as well as some underbridges. This put the total estimated cost up to £12m. The existing A9 was considered adequate for then current needs but plans were in hand for improvements, including dual carriageway as far as Dingwall, estimated to cost £8.25m over many years.

Roberston drummed up public support for his proposal with meetings at various places and it was mentioned in several newspapers. But an editorial in the Aberdeen Press & Journal on 8th July described Robertson as persistent and fertile in ideas; it concluded 'No quick acceptance of the idea need be expected but it should create intense interest'.

BR only had limited involvement in the discussions, but M P Beazley of the BTC did not think the project was worthwhile. It was up to Highways to decide whether such as road was justified, although the BTC 'would probably be very glad to be rid of the burden of this unprofitable line'. Beazley did think electric or diesel working with modern signalling would provide an efficient railway service but he said there was no evidence that the traffic justified that. It is strange that diesel working was dismissed, as the BTC Modernisation Plan had been published in January that year.

The civil servants continued for several weeks to draft a reply from the Minister to Sir David. The Scottish Office was asked for its opinion but its response was not recorded, although it was preparing to take over responsibility for Scottish roads from 1st April 1956. That of course meant that the proposed Autobahn had to compete with other major projects in Scotland such as upgrading the A94 and building the Forth Road Bridge.

There followed a long period of letters to and from Robertson. Finance and safety were raised, but there appears to have been no concerted effort for the two parties to come to an understanding. The Scottish officials took time to respond. In the autumn of 1956, the Scottish Secretary, James Stuart, had the bright idea of asking the Defence Ministry if it objected. The three services were asked and the matter came before the Chiefs of Staff Committee in February 1957. As an aside, it was the discovery of an entry in their Minutes, which are headed 'Top Secret. For UK Eyes Only. Not to be copied', that triggered this research. The military staff studied the use made of the line north of Inverness and concluded that it had no strategic value. A bit of a surprise coming only 12 years after the end of the War, and not the answer wanted.

So the Scottish Secretary was not let off the hook, but in the meantime Anthony Eden resigned as prime minister on 13th January 1957 as a result of the Suez Crisis. In Harold Macmillan's cabinet, John Scott Maclay became Scottish Secretary and there were three new Under Secretaries - Lord John Hope, Jack Nixon Browne and Niall Macpherson.

Sir David now turned his attention to promoting a North of Scotland Development Corporation which was intended to encourage industrial development in the towns in the north, but was not supported by the government nor by some MPs as it would have duplicated work being done by other public bodies. It was debated on 15th March 1957 but the Government talked out the private bill.

At this point, interest in the Highland Autobahn seems to have died down. The relevant papers were looked at again in 1962 and an internal memo of 10th October 1962 recorded that there did not seem to have been a 'rounding-off' letter from the Secretary of State. Sir David must have realised that his scheme had too many problems.

Reviewing all the files and newspaper reports, the proposals for and arguments against the scheme missed a number of important considerations. Much was made of the speed necessary to compensate for the longer distances. But maintaining an average of 50 - 60 mph would not have been practical with most motor vehicles in the mid-1950s. The national speed limit for lorries over 3 tons was only raised from 20 mph to 30 mph from 1st May 1957. Similarly many motor cars were not capable of travelling at high speed, and if they were, they were not necessarily capable of stopping in a reasonable distance. One great advantage of the autobahn would have been that traffic on it would not have been hampered by town and village streets. Nor were bypasses mentioned in the plans for upgrading the existing A9 for which a need must surely have been apparent at the time.

Neither the proponents for, nor the opponents of, the scheme seemed to have considered how traffic would flow on the new road. There would have been a wide spread of vehicle speeds such that overtaking would have been common. While the railway track has no sharp bends, many sections have gentle curves which would have limited visibility. The proposal was made before double white lines were introduced; those unfamiliar with the road would have been at added danger of overtaking in unsafe places.

Road traffic conditions have altered radically in 70 years but one is left wondering whether the implementation of the scheme was properly evaluated by both Robertson and the civil servants. While it is understandable that Robertson thought in simplistic terms about his vision, the civil servants should have understood far better how roads function.

A part of the West Approach Road, Edinburgh - a former double-track section of railway. Barely room for a single carriageway road - this shows why it wouldn't have been simple to convert the single-track Far North Line.

Not the most desirable use for a railway bridge!

This is the Connel Bridge on the former Ballachulish branch near Oban. It used to be shared between rail and road traffic. Now a single-track road.

Photo: M J Richardson
Licensed by CC BY-SA 2.0